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Abstract
This paper examines the dynamic relationship between interest rates, inflation and eco-
nomic growth using the longest available dataset for the UK and a vector autoregression
(VAR). The approach adopted enables structural breaks to be identified in the dynamic
system. It then can ascribe breaks in covariance to changes in volatility or to changes in
correlation. Our empirical findings indicate several structural breaks in the relationship,
which lead to very different inference compared to a constant parameter model. For exam-
ple, interest rates respond much more strongly to growth or inflation over recent decades.
Furthermore, our evidence suggests that all variables become more persistent after the clas-
sical gold standard ended with the onset of WW1.
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1 Introduction
The short-term interest rate is a key variable in Financial Economics. It is closely related to
the economic policy rate set by central banks (or governments). Arguably, the primary tool
used by policymakers to manage the macroeconomy is the interest rate. Theoretically there is
widespread support that interest rates respond to both inflation and economic activity (interest
rates lag these variables) but also that interest rates themselves impact inflation and economic
activity (interest rates lead these variables). This paper seeks to model the dynamic behaviour
of the short-term interest rate, inflation and growth by implementing recently developed tech-
niques. In particular our paper seeks to identify if there has been any structural breaks in the
linkages between these variables in the context of the UK over the period 1820-2014. Second, it
sheds light on the timing of these structural breaks; do they, for example, occur when there is a
change in monetary policy regime? Third, we examine if each structural break is the result of a
shift in volatility or a change in correlation using the recently developed methodology of Bataa,
Osborn, Sensier and van Dijk (2013). An important contribution of this paper is the finding
that structural breaks in the contemporaneous linkages between the short term interest rate,
inflation and growth were almost all volatility breaks up until 1951 but there was a correlation
break in 1990. Finally, we analyse if the series exhibit changes in persistence.
The primary analysis is conducted using a vector autoregression (VAR) model and tests for
structural breaks in the parameters of the model. Our empirical analysis employs the generalized
VAR methodology of Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), and the
forecast error variance decomposition analysis of which is updated in Diebold and Yulmaz (2009,
2012, 2014). More importantly, we implement generalized versions of the impulse responses and
the forecast error variance decompositions that are not sensitive to variable ordering. We also
allow for structural breaks using the methodology of Bataa, Osborn, Sensier and van Dijk
(2013,2014). This methodology allows for changes in both the VAR parameters as well as the
contemporaneous covariance matrix, but can allow for breaks to each at different time periods.
Further, the covariance matrix breaks can be identified as either a variance break or a correlation
break. Our UK data sample is the lengthiest available, covering about two centuries, which is an
important consideration given the importance of timespan for this type of time-series analysis
(Shiller and Perron, 1985).
To preview some of our results, we find that: 1) most breaks in the last two centuries can be
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primarily attributed to changes in volatility; 2) after the collapse of the classical gold standard
the persistence of all three variables increases1; 3) there is very clear evidence that the dynamic
relationship between inflation and the short rate changes after the gold standard ended; 4) two
changes occurred in recent decades- first, since 1975 the short term interest rate starts to respond
very strongly to the past growth rates and second, after 1990 the magnitude of the short term
interest rate response to past inflation greatly increases; 5) our results confirm earlier research
that a great moderation occurred but suggests that the structural change is apparent by 1952
in UK annual data. We do find a covariance matrix break in 1989 but this can be attributed
to a break in correlation rather than a break in volatility. One other important finding of this
study is that short term interest rates primarily lag growth and inflation but do not lead.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a short review of previous literature.
A description of the data is presented and unit root analysis is carried out in section 3. In this
section we also explain the method that we use to identify changes in the univariate behaviour
of the short-term interest rate, inflation and economic growth. Then in section 4 we discuss
our multivariate econometric techniques that deals with structural breaks in the relationship
between these variables. The empirical results are presented in section 5 and we conclude in
section 6.
2 Review of the Empirical Literature
2.1 Inflation leading nominal interest rates
There is a large literature that surveys the Fisher effect-the contemporaneous relationship be-
tween inflation and nominal interest rates (see for example Mishkin, 1992). We are concerned
with the leading or lagging relationship between inflation and nominal interest rates in this
paper and so do not survey this literature in detail here. Nonetheless, there is much literature
that finds the response of interest rates to inflation to be less than unity in the short-run; this
implies a slow adjustment of interest rates to inflation (Mishkin, 1992; Evans and Lewis, 1995)
although Crowder and Hoffman (1996) provide some counter-evidence that the coefficient is
approximately unity (after-tax) in the long-run.
1The classical gold standard broke down during World War I, as major belligerents resorted to inflationary
finance, and was briefly reinstated from 1925 to 1931 as the Gold Exchange Standard. Between 1946 and 1971,
countries operated under the Bretton Woods System. Under this further modification of the gold standard, most
countries settled their international balances in U.S. dollars, but the U.S. government promised to redeem other
central banks holdings of dollars for gold at a fixed rate of thirty-five dollars per ounce.
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Rapach (2003) investigates if inflation has a long-run impact (if there is long-run money
superneutrality). Alternative theories suggest that inflation could have a permanent effect on
the real interest rate and on real output. Rapach (2003) estimates the long-run responses of the
real interest rate and real output for 14 industrialised countries using post-war annual data. In
all countries a positive inflation shock leads to a permanent fall in the real interest rate and in
some countries a positive inflation shock leads to an increase in real output. Hence the evidence
is not very supportive of long-run money superneutrality.
Rapach and Wohar (2005) find extensive evidence of structural breaks in the real interest
rate and in inflation for an international sample of monthly post-war data. Generally the breaks
coincide with increases (decreases) in inflation being associated with a decrease (increase) in
the real interest rate.
2.2 The Price Puzzle: Nominal interest rates leading inflation
Historical data shows that there is a positive relationship between inflation and the federal
funds rate, which has been dubbed the ”price puzzle” (Bernanke and Blinder 1992; Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans 1994, and Sims 1992). The reason it is a puzzle is because an unexpected
contraction of money supply (i.e. an unexpected increase in the federal funds rate) is expected
to be followed by a decrease in the price level, rather than an increase.
Sims (1992), using a recursive identification scheme, finds a positive effect on the price level
from a negative monetary shock (e.g. from an increase in interest rates). This is contrary
to traditional macroeconomic models where a fall in interest rates, increases money holdings
and increases the price level. Sims (1992) argues that this anomaly, termed the price puzzle,
is due to an omitted variable problem. There have been a number of different explanations
for this ”Price Puzzle”. These include a misspecification of VARs (Giordani, 2004; Bernanke,
Boivin, and Eliasz 2005) and theoretical models which try and justify the observed rise in prices
(Barth and Ramey, 2002; Rabanal, 2007). Rusnak, Havranek, and Horvath (2013) conduct
a meta analysis through the collection of all published research (103 studies for 31 countries)
examining monetary transmission within a VAR framework. Their analysis also suggests that
the price puzzle is due to model mis-specification. Nevertheless, the evidence so far seems to
rest primarily on recent history and on monthly or quarterly data. In this paper we take a much
longer perspective and examine if this so-called anomaly is apparent in annual data.
Balke and Emery (1994) confirm a price puzzle in the US, a positive correlation between
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federal funds rate increases and subsequent increases in prices. They find that the strength of
this correlation is not uniform over the postwar period. In particular, the price puzzle broke
down in the 1980s with a correlation between fed funds and inflation that is close to zero; but
the correlation is still not negative, as traditional theory would predict.
Balke and Emery (1994) argue that a plausible explanation why the price puzzle was strong
during the 1960s and 1970s was that the Federal Reserve responded to supply shocks by raising
the federal funds rate but not enough to eliminate the inflationary consequences of the shock.
This will result in a positive correlation between the federal funds rate and inflation. They also
suggest the price puzzle is much weaker during the 1980s either because the Federal Reserve
responded more vigorously to inflationary shocks, or there simply have been fewer large infla-
tionary shocks to the economy. Balke and Emery’s (1994) VAR evidence also suggests that
supply shocks play an important role and that accounting for these (via modelling the term
spread) can reduce the price puzzle even for the pre-1980 period. Thus, the implication is that
the Federal Reserve responds to negative supply shocks by increasing the funds rate, but not
by enough to fully offset the inflationary implications of the shock.
Lee (1992) conducts a VAR analysis of the relationship between interest rates, inflation, real
activity and stock returns from January 1947 through December 1987. He finds interest rates
explain a substantial fraction of the variation in inflation.
2.3 Nominal interest rates leading growth
A large body of research (e.g. Bernanke and Blinder, 1992) has demonstrated a strong correla-
tion between measures of short-term nominal interest rates and real output. Such a correlation
is puzzling, as most textbook theoretical models link long-term real interest rates to output.
These models also argue that there is at best a weak link between short-term interest rates and
long-term interest rates.
However, Fuhrer and Moore (1995) developed a rational expectations structural model of
the US macro economy. They found that their model matches the dynamic properties of some
important macroeconomic variables. The model also allows for a structural interpretation of
the well documented, but puzzling, negative correlation between real output and the short-term
interest rate. They argue that the systematic way in which monetary policy has leaned against
the wind, in combination with a sluggish inflation adjustment and a structural IS curve that
relates output to the rationally expected long-term real interest rate, has made the sample path
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of long-term real interest rates look like the short-term nominal interest rate. Fama (1981)
argues there is a negative relationship between stock returns and inflation because inflation
proxies for expectations of future real output.
Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) present evidence that the real short-term interest rate and
especially the term spread, provide information about future economic growth. The real short-
term interest rate is negatively related to future growth, while the term spread is positively
related to future growth. Plosser and Rouwenhorst (1994) however, suggest it is information in
the long-end of the term structure that has predictive power for future industrial production.
Haug and Dewald (2011) examine the relationship between money growth and inflation and
real output growth for 11 industrialised countries from 1880-2001. They find money growth
leads or is contemporaneously related to inflation, however, money growth does not affect real
output growth in the long term. They also find that there is no structural change in the longer
term relationship between money growth and inflation even though changes in policy regime
did occur. Their analysis applies band-pass filters to extract business cycle and longer-term
cycles from each of the variables of interest.
2.4 Inflation and growth
There is an extensive amount of empirical studies documenting a negative growth effect of
inflation across countries (Gylfason & Herbertsson, 2001; Barro, 2013; among others). Based on
a large panel of 170 countries, Gylfason and Herbertsson (2001) finds a stronger negative growth
effect of inflation using the Penn World data relative to that found when the World Bank data
is used after controlling for other traditional growth determinants. Stronger negative effects on
growth at lower levels of inflation are documented by Gillman, Harris, & Matyas (2004) while
Guerrero (2006), using countries’ past hyperinflation experience as the instrument, confirms
previous OLS-based studies’, that find growth cost of inflation to be robust. Though robust,
recent studies report that it is only at a high inflation rate where results are significant, while
at the low ranges of inflation rates results are ambiguous (Sarel, 1996; Ghosh & Phillips, 1998;
Khan & Senhadji, 2001; Bick, 2010; Omay & Kan, 2010; Lopez-Villavicencio & Mignon, 2011).
These findings depend on the precise inflation threshold which is a function of the countries
being examined (i.e. developing, developed or mixed of both countries). For example, Khan
and Senhadji (2001) and Lopez-Villavicencio & Mignon (2011) find that the inflation threshold
in emerging and developing countries appears to be much higher than those found in developed
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countries (see Bick, 2010 and Omay and Kan, 2010, among others). Therefore, pooling all of
these countries into one panel data set may bias the empirical finding. Lee (1992) finds inflation
explains little of the variation in real activity.
Canova, Gambetti, & Pappa (2007) investigate the nature and causes of structural changes
in the dynamics of output growth and inflation in the US, UK and the Euro area. They employ
a time-varying coefficient VAR model (including inflation, output growth, short-term interest
rate and money growth). The structural model is estimated using Bayesian methods including
Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods to estimate the posterior distribution of the parameters of
interest. They identify three types of structural shocks (technology, real demand, and monetary
disturbance) using robust sign restrictions. They find that there are important similarities in
the structural dynamics of inflation across countries over the last 35 years. However, the cross
country similarities of output growth dynamics are only seen since the 1990s. Movements in
volatility and persistent are accounted for by the combination of all three structural shocks.
Sources of inflation persistence and volatility are similar but sources of output growth dynamics
vary across countries.
2.5 Structural breaks and the Great Moderation
Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) show that inflation persistence is significantly higher under
managed-exchange-rate regimes than under gold-based, fixed-exchange-rate regime2. They use
a sample split and RPI data for the UK between 1857 and 1987 and CPI data for the US
between 1892 and 1987. According to them the autoregressive parameter (persistence) of an
AR(1) model for inflation should increase in 1914 and around the end of the Bretton Woods
system in 1968 due to the relaxation of the discipline imposed by these systems. They provide
a model demonstrating that greater monetary accommodation of inflation and exchange-rate
accommodation of inflation differentials increase inflation persistence. Burdekin and Siklos
(1999) revisit their results with a formal structural break test of unknown timing and updated
data and confirm a shift in inflation persistence around 1914 but contradict Alogoskoufis and
Smith’s (1991) premise that there was a further shift in 1968. Burdekin and Siklos (1999)
provide references showing that the effective constraints on domestic monetary policy under the
Bretton Woods System were much looser than those imposed under the gold standard and the
2Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) and Alogoskoufis (1992) also examine relative inflation persistence, as given by
inflation differentials between countries. We limit our analysis to the more basic issue of the inflation persistence
present in the UK only.
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collapse of that system cannot be as important. Bai and Perron (2003) also revisit Alogoskoufis
and Smith’s (1991) post World War II data and find the persistence increasing from 0.274 to
0.739, but no change in the intercept, in 1967. The estimate of the break is, however, imprecisely
estimated with a 95% confidence interval covering the period 1961-1973. When they used the
sequential testing strategy after the overall test they find two breaks, one in 1967 and the other
in 1975.
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) documented high inflation persistence in post-WWII U.S. Benati
(2008a) studies inflation persistence in an international sample and across differing monetary
regimes. Benati (2008a) questions whether high inflation persistence is a pervasive feature in
differing settings since in some cases inflation is not highly persistent. Benati (2008a) also notes
that shifts in trend inflation and in price stickiness could impact the time series dynamics of
inflation.
Work highlighting the Great Moderation and its cause includes Stock and Watson (2002;
2007), Kim and Nelson (1999) for the US and Benati (2008b) and Benati and Surico (2008)
for the UK. Benati (2008b) results indicate that the great moderation in the UK was more
due to good luck (the absence of major shocks) rather than to good policy; his counterfactual
analysis suggests that different policy regimes would not have dramatically impacted the path
of inflation or growth during his sample period.
However, none of these UK studies have examined the impact of structural breaks in this
context, nor do they estimate impulse responses to such shocks. Several subsequent international
studies suggest inflation only affects the short-run dynamics of interest rates, although shocks
to interest rates can also have an impact on subsequent inflation.
3 Data and Preliminary Analysis
Our empirical analysis is based upon an extremely long time-series of annual UK data covering
the period 1820-2014 from Officer (2015). The main variables of interest are the nominal short-
term interest rate, retail price index inflation and real economic growth.3 There are two main
reasons for selecting this data. First, an important consideration for low frequency analysis of
financial data is the length of the series. That is, the number of years covered in the sample is
3Officer (2015) provides two types of short term interest rates since 1790: one is contemporary and the other
is consistent; they are exactly the same after 1919. We choose the contemporary series but their correlation from
1820 to 1918 is quite high, 99.6%.
8
of much greater consequence than the number of observations per se. (Shiller and Perron, 1985,
Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). Second, given our focus on inflation in this study and the
tendency for this to be generally calculated as a year-on-year change due to seasonality issues
makes an annual sampling of data preferable. Due to differencing of the log real GDP and log
RPI the starting date of our main analysis coincides with the establishment of the formal Gold
Standard in 1821, when Britain adopted it following the introduction of the gold sovereign by
the new Royal Mint at Tower Hill in 1816.
3.1 Unit root analysis
In light of possible changes in extended historic data, any consideration of unit root properties
should also take into account possible trend breaks. Perron (1989) draws attention to the
importance of trend breaks for the conduct of unit root tests, with recent developments allowing
for possible trend breaks under both the unit root null hypothesis and the trend stationary
alternative. Therefore, we apply the procedure of Kejriwal and Perron (2010) that employs
sequential hypothesis tests to estimate the number of trend breaks and are robust to the unit
root properties of the data, with unit root tests then applied to the appropriately detrended
data. This procedure is described in Kejriwal and Lopez (2013). In brief, the stability of the
trend function is initially tested against one break in slope and level using the test of Perron
and Yabu (2009). If this is rejected, the unit root test allows possible multiple trend breaks
under both the null and alternative hypotheses using the procedure of Carrion-i-Silvestre, Kim
and Perron (2009). Unit root tests are then based on so-called M -tests analysed by Ng and
Perron (2001) with quasi-generalized least squares (GLS) detrending and lag specification as
proposed by Qu and Perron (2007).
[INSERT: TABLE 1]
Estimation of trend breaks using the Kejriwal and Perron (2010) procedure requires a priori
specification of the maximum number of breaks. Although the appropriate maximum number
is unclear, we specify this to be three. Since their method is a sequential procedure based on
sample splitting, we allow the ’trimming’ parameter required in the structural break procedure
to increase as the effective sample size decreases. In particular, we set this to 0.15 when only
one break is considered over the whole sample; increase it to 0.20 in the subsequent splitting of
the original sample. All tests are conducted at an asymptotic 5% level. We use AIC with the
maximum lag length selection rule of pmax = integer(4× (T/100)1/4) to select the appropriate
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AR process. It has to be mentioned that the break dates are re-estimated every time after the
sequential identification of the additional break.
Numbers in the first row of panel A in Table 1 are the exponential Wald statistics discussed
by Perron and Yabu (2009) for one break in both slope and level, valid for both I(0) and I(1)
error components, while those in the rows below are the suprema of that statistic when applied
to the subsamples defined under the corresponding null, the critical values for such sequentially
applied statistics being provided in Kejriwal and Perron (2010). Five percent critical values
corresponding 0 vs. 1 break, 1 vs. 2 breaks and 2 vs. 3 breaks hypotheses are 3.12, 3.66 and
3.71, respectively. Statistics in panel B are GLS-detrended M unit root test statistics, analysed
by Ng and Perron (2001) under no trend break case and extended by Carrion-i-Silvestre et al.
(2009) to multiple breaks; bold statistics correspond to the number of breaks selected through
the Kejriwal and Perron (2010) procedure. Since the critical values are case-dependent they
are provided next to each test statistic in square brackets. Stars indicate the rejection of the
relevant null hypothesis (namely, the lower number of indicated breaks in panel A and presence
of a unit root in panel B) at the 5% level. Rejection in panel A (panel B) applies when the
statistic is greater (less) than the critical value. All critical values are asymptotic and from the
indicated studies.
Summary results are reported in Table 1 with panel A showing that the sequential procedure
indicates the maximum of three breaks for short term rates and log real GDP and two breaks
for log RPI.4 The rejection of the null of 2 breaks against 3 breaks is marginal in both cases
as the sequential test statistic Seq(3/2) of 4.3 and 4.44, respectively, are closest to its critical
value of 3.71. Panel B provides unit root test statistics for all numbers of breaks from zero to
three. Overall, the conclusion that log real GDP and log RPI are I(1) is robust. Results for
short term rates depend on the number of breaks allowed. I(0) is preferred if one assumes two
breaks. We consider interest rates in level. Economically such an inference is also justified.
Differenced log real growth can be seen to be I(0). Differenced log RPI appears to contain unit
root if one allows for 2 and 3 trend breaks, but this also can be a manifestation of outliers or
volatility breaks; otherwise it appears to be stationary.
4Further results relating to trend breaks, together with a range of unit root test statistics, are available from
the authors on request.
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3.2 Univariate analysis
Since our annual data span almost two hundred years, during which time potentially many
structural changes and extreme events happened, it is interesting to consider univariate prop-
erties of each series. To that end we use the univariate iterative testing procedure of Bataa,
Osborn, Sensier and van Dijk (2014), which decomposes observed variable Yt into components
capturing level (Lt), outliers (Ot) and dynamics (yt) using
Yt = Lt +Ot + yt (1)
where structural breaks are permitted in all components (except Ot). Lt models the mean
which is allowed to change over time. Dynamics are captured through an AR model without an
intercept, with breaks permitted, not only in the AR coefficients, but also in the disturbance
variance. All breaks (level, dynamics and variance) can be at distinct points of time, and
hence regimes are defined as specific to these individual components, while outliers are detected
allowing for any mean shifts5.
[INSERT: TABLE 2 here]
Formal testing is done in an iterative fashion and results from the convergence of this
procedure are shown in Table 26. Tests are conducted at 5% significance level, with 10%
trimming.
In panel A the null hypothesis of no break against an alternative of up to a maximum 8
breaks is tested using the WDmax test (often termed as Overall test). When WDmax statistic
exceed its 95% critical value, which is provided in the table footnote, the null is rejected and
the numerical value of the statistic is marked with stars. Otherwise we conclude that there is
no break. If WDmax statistic rejects, the identification of the exact number of breaks proceeds
in a sequential manner as in Bai and Perron (1998). We first test the null of one break against
an alternative of two breaks using Seq(2/1) statistic. If it exceeds its 95% critical value, which
is also provided in the table footnote, we reject the null and the numerical value of the statistic
is marked with stars. Otherwise we conclude that there is just one break. Such sequential tests
are applied until we fail to reject the null or we reach the maximum possible number of breaks.
5Our definition of an outlier is based on 5 times Interquartile Range (IQR) away from the median (after
removing the mean breaks) as in Bataa et al. (2014). For robustness, we also tried 7 times IQR but the results
did not change much.
6Number of iterations required to converge is shown in the bottom of the table. The main loop iterates
between outliers, and level and dynamic breaks, while the sub loop iterates between break dates in AR coefficient
breaks and AR model residual variance breaks
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Once the number of breaks are identified the locations of these breaks are estimated using the
quasi maximum likelihood procedure of Qu and Perron (2007)and reported in bold, along with
their 90% confidence intervals. Numbers below these dates are means in the sub-sample, defined
by above break dates. We also report the whole sample mean, ignoring the breaks, in brackets.
Although we allow for up to 8 breaks we find no break in the level of mean growth rate and
only one break in inflation in 1914 and two breaks in short term rates; break dates are rather
precisely estimated with relatively tight confidence intervals. The inflation break coincides well
with the collapse of Gold Standard. Deflation is found to be a regular feature of the UK economy
during its reign. Indeed the annual average inflation rate is -0.06% a year prior to the break
compared to 2.6% a year in the whole sample. Most periods of deflation also appear to have
been largely unanticipated, with short term interest rates rarely approaching their zero lower
bound and no corresponding break is found around 1914. Short term interest rate and inflation
are lower in general in the earlier period, with short rate reaching exceptionally low level of
0.54% a year after the pound left the gold standard in 1931 and until 19517.
We find two deflation outliers, dated at 1921 and 1922, in panel B. These are related with
the end of World War I and follow the depression of 1919-1921.
Panel C reports on break test results associated with the dynamic component. Explanations
of WDmax and Seq(2/1) statistics are the same as in panel A. AIC, HQ and SIC are the lag
length chosen by the respective information criteria and we use AIC to ensure no residual serial
correlation. If there are breaks in the autoregressive parameters we estimate persistence mea-
sures, the sum of autoregressive parameters in this case, across across regimes, i.e. subsamples,
and ignoring the breaks (in brackets) in the row below.
Among the persistence measures that of inflation is hotly debated. It measures speed that
inflation converges to its mean after a shock to inflation process. Our univariate analysis fails
to detect by only a small margin any changes in this tendency which prevents inflation from
reverting to its previous path has been stable; WDmax test is 10.50 while the critical value is
10.67. Although our more powerful multivariate analysis in the next section will overturn this
conclusion, this is worth noting that a failure to reject the null hypothesis of constant inflation
persistence around the collapse of the Classical Gold Standard in 1914 seems to be at odds with
7Besides happening close to the 30% devaluation of the pound sterling in 1949, and the start of the post-war
socio-economic developments, 1951 is also close to the reopening of the free gold market after the war. Gold is
often regarded as a safe investment. Thus as a legitimate investment alternative to cash saving opens up the
interest rates has to increase. However 19 years is the shortest possible regime since in order to statistically
detect a break we need at least 10% of our total number of 193 observations to lie between any two breaks.
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the earlier economic and econometric literature8.
We find no persistence break in growth rates. Short rate persistence emerges in 1940, but
the 90% confidence interval is rather imprecise: between 1926 and 1954. Failure to acknowledge
a break is nontrivial however. The persistence is 0.54 prior to the break and it behaves almost
like a unit root process afterwards, in contrast to 0.87 estimated over the whole sample. This
is after allowing for the mean breaks in panel A.
Panel D provides results on the volatility break tests. In addition to test statistics and break
dates, it also reports estimates of the residual standard deviations of the AR processes, across
the volatility regimes defined by the break dates and also ignoring these breaks and using the
whole sample residual (but taking into account of breaks in the other components: level and
AR coefficients).
It is interesting to see that volatility of all three series remain constant for at least 100 years
until the WWI unsettles the growth volatility. Although we have another growth volatility
break after the WWII their 90% confidence intervals are so wide that easily accommodate one
another. Nonetheless post WWII period is characterized by a historic stability.
Short rate volatility almost disappears at exactly the same year as its level did. But there
is a resurrection of not only its level but also volatility in 1951. In fact it is at historic high
level of 1.56% a year since then but the actual beginning of this active short rate is again
rather imprecise: its 90% confidence interval indicates it could have started as late as 1986.
Inflation volatility was at least twice more volatile prior to 1980 which seem to coincide with
the beginning of the Thatcher Government disinflation policies; but the confidence interval is
extremely wide again.
Although Bataa et al. (2014) warn that confidence intervals in the context of iterative
methodology are only indicative, the sheer width of these intervals for the dynamic and volatility
breaks necessitate a more powerful multivariate set up, such as a VAR model, to better pin
down the break dates. Indeed given the theoretical connection between these variables, such an
analysis allows us to exploit the cross-sectional dimension for obtaining more precise inference
on these structural breaks (see Bai, Lumsdaine & Stock, 1998 and Qu and Perron, 2007).
Lutkepohl (1989) show that Granger causality (GC) tests over-reject in finite samples when
8However when we use 10% significance level in the iterative procedure we do find a break in 1914 with 90%
confidence interval between 1911 and 1917. One seemingly surprising finding is that there is no evidence of the
second break in early 1990s that is often expected with the adoption of inflation targeting regime and to have
marked a reversal of inflation persistence back to it pre-1914 patterns.
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mean breaks are ignored. Moreover because the mean breaks in short rate and inflation series are
both economically and statistically very significant they might coincide with tests for breaks
in VAR dynamic coefficients and variance-covariance matrix. There is no prior information
whether they coincide with potential VAR breaks and ignoring them is not a wise option either.
Indeed Ng and Vogelsang (2002) demonstrate that inference based on the estimated VARs,
forecasts and impulse response functions are generally invalid when mean shifts are omitted.
They provide two choices: (i) remove the breaks before estimating the dynamic parameters, and
(ii) estimate the mean shifts simultaneously with the autoregressive parameters. We choose the
former as simulations in Ng and Vogelsang (2002) show that this is the best empirical approach
when the level breaks in individual series do not coincide and when the breaks are so-called
”additive outlier” type. The latter condition is already embedded in Bataa et al. (2014)
procedure that we use. Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Gambe and Joutz (1993) also make
the same choice. Thus, we take out 3 ”local” means from the short-rate (1820-1930, 1931-1950,
1951-2014), 2 ”local” means from the inflation rate (1820-1913 and 1914-2014). Since there is
no mean break in the growth rate we remove its whole sample mean before our multivariate
analysis.
4 Multivariate analysis
This section first describes the generalized VAR methodology of Koop, Pesaran and Potter
(1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) analysis
of which was recently updated in Diebold and Yulmaz (2009, 2012, 2014). Given our data are
annual and cover a long time span it is important to allow for correlated shocks. We rely
on both the generalized impulse responses (GIRF) and the generalized forecast error variance
decomposition (GFEVD) to derive relationship between growth, inflation and interest rates
that is not sensitive to variable ordering. The GVEFD we use is the normalized version as in
Diebold and Yuilmaz (2009, 2012, 2014), where the variance decompositions sum up to 100,
and is explained is subsection 4.1. It then outlines the iterative structural break testing method
of Bataa, Osborn, Sensier and van Dijk (2013) that would allow us to extend the Diebold
and Yulmaz (2009, 2012, 2014) methodology by calculating confidence intervals for impulse
responses and various spillover indices that are allowed to be different over time.
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4.1 Innovation accounting
Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), referred to KPPS as in Diebold
and Yulmaz (2012), provide a framework for studying impulse responses and forecast error
variance decompositions that are insensitive to the variable ordering in a VAR model. Let us
consider the following conventional VAR system for n demeaned variables:
yt =
p∑
i=1
Φiyt−i + ut (2)
where yt is a vector of stationary annual series. The error term ut in (2) has mean zero and
covariance matrix E(utu
′
t) = Σ, and is temporally uncorrelated. The corresponding moving
average form is
yt =
∞∑
i=1
Aiut−i (3)
Based on KPPS we can obtain the generalized impulse response function of the one unit shock
by
ψj(H) = σ
−1
jj AHΣej , H = 0, 1, 2 . . . (4)
where σjj is j
th residual variance, and ej is a selection vector with unity in the j
th element and
zero otherwise.
This GIRF shows the effect of a shock to the jth element of yt,equal to one percentage in
magnitude, on the vector yt+h for h = 0, 1, ...
The variance decomposition that allows to assess the fraction of the H step-ahead error
variance in forecasting yi that is due to shocks to yj , ∀j 6= i, for each i is the following:
θij(H) =
σ−1jj
∑H−1
h=0 (e
′
iAhΣej)
2∑H−1
h=0 e
′
iAhΣA
′
hej
i, j = 1, . . . , n (5)
Notice that Σ = DPD, where D is a diagonal matrix of standard deviations and P is a
correlation matrix; thus both the volatility and the correlations of the VAR residuals play a
role in calculation of the IRF and FEVD alongside the VAR parameters.
Based on the normalized version of above Diebold and Yulmaz (2009, 2012, 2014) define
total, directional, bivariate and net spillover measures. Given that their spillover measures are
already very popular we omit their details here9.
9In addition to the 3 references here they apply their methodology in three other articles, have one Oxford
University Press published book and a website http:financialconnectedness.org. The above 3 papers only have
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Our main interest is to test the stability of the above model. If the parameter stability is
rejected we would like to see the consequences of those changes in the IRF, FEVD and the
spillover measures. Parameter instability could originate from those in Φi, and thus in Ai, D
and P. Therefore we use Bataa et al.’s (2013) iterative structural break testing method. Space
considerations preclude a discussion of their method here but a full exposition may be found in
the original study.
Their method, also used in Bataa et al (2015), allows one to test for and identify which
of its individual elements are behind an identified break in Φi. Conditional mean specification
(VAR) can affect the estimations of the variance-covariance matrix, and ultimately the FEVD
and various spillover measures that are based on it. Indeed in a related literature, Cheung
and Ng (1996) and Hong (2001) point out that causality in mean may affect tests for causality
in variance. That is because causality in mean affects the structure of the disturbance terms.
Moreover, Lumsdaine and Ng (1999), Mikosch and Starica (2004) and Blake and Kapetanios
(2007) show that misspecification of the conditional mean, including structural breaks, may
lead to spurious rejection of the null hypothesis of no ARCH. This stresses the importance of
not only modeling all important breaks but also not imposing spurious ones.
5 Results
This section considers whether the parameters and the variance-covariance matrix of the VAR
model are constant over time and the implications of that time-variation. In particular, sub-
section 5.1 examines possible structural changes in both the autoregressive parameters and the
variance-covariance matrix of a VAR through Bataa et al.’s (2013) procedure, while subsec-
tions 5.2 and 5.3 identify the sources of these system-wide breaks. Finally, sections 5.4 and
5.5 examine the implications of the detected breaks through impulse responses and forecast
error variance decomposition, respectively. To facilitate comparisons, all results are expressed
in percentage terms.
5.1 Breaks in the VAR
Owing to the large number of autoregressive coefficients in the VAR, a maximum of three breaks
is permitted (Mc = 3), with a minimum of 20% of the sample required in each regime while
678 citations as of July 2015 according to Google Scholar.
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we allow for a maximum of eight breaks for the variance covariance matrix (Mv = 8 with 10%
trimming).
The estimation of the VAR with 2 lags, guided by the information criterion and to ensure
absence of residual autocorrelation, implies that two years of data are ’lost’, so that the sample
period for estimation starts in 1823.
The first column of Table 3 contains results for breaks in the autoregressive parameters of
equation (2), while the second column provides structural break test results for the variance-
covariance matrix. Explanations of the overall test (WDmax), sequential tests and break date
estimations are the same as for Table 2, thus omitted here10.
In contrast to Table 2 we have a new line called bootstrap p-value under the estimated
break dates to check the finite sample validity of the asymptotic inference since we have much
more parameters compared to our 192 observations. These bootstrap p-values evaluate the
significance of the each break and we conclude that a certain break is significant only if it is
less than 5%.
WDmax statistic for the VAR coefficients are 232.86 compared to an asymptotic 5% critical
value of 42.63. The asymptotic sequential Seq(2/1) test also rejects the null of one break (against
two). Seq(3/2) is rejected and we conclude using the asymptotic distribution that there are two
coefficient breaks. The bootstrap procedure confirms this conclusion (p-values of 0.04% and
1.07%). It is worth noting that the persistence break detected for the short rate at 1940 in
Table 2 is completely explained away by the multivariate set-up.
As for the variance-covariance matrix the WDmax test statistic is again highly significant
and the sequential tests indicate five breaks. The bootstrap inference also confirms. It is note-
worthy the variance-covariance matrix breaks are essentially those identified in the univariate
analysis of subsection 3.2, with two exceptions. We did not find the breaks in XXth century
in the univariate analysis and this shows that the multivariate analysis can indeed be more
powerful in detecting breaks.
It is reassuring that although we allowed for a maximum of 3 breaks in the VAR coefficient
and 8 breaks in the variance covariance matrix we do not reach this limit. This also casts some
doubt on the suitability of TVP-VAR techniques which forces, without testing, each parameter
10Qu and Perron’s (2007) test statistics have the same limit distributions as those in Bai and Perron (1998),
who tabulate critical values up to 10 parameters. Although Bai and Perron (2003) provide response surfaces for
estimating critical values, Hall and Sakkas (2013) show these surfaces can lead to misleading inferences with a
large number of parameters. Therefore we simulate critical values suitable for our cases; details are available
from the authors on request.
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to change each period, in this case. 20% and 10% trimmings used in this case implies 38 and
19 observations, respectively, have to lie between any two breaks. However none of the breaks
are subject to this boundary problem, except the second covariance matrix break in 1869.
Even after removing the level shifts/low frequency movements as discussed in Section 3.2.
we find breaks in the dynamic relationships, i.e. in VAR parameters. In Section 3.2. level
shifts occurred in the short rate in 1931 and 1951, and in inflation in 1914. These are removed
accordingly and the VAR is estimated with demeaned data. But we still find VAR coefficient
breaks in 1916 and 1975. Thus the outbreak of WWI, and the subsequent burst in both mean
and volatility of inflation appears to have changed the dynamic relationship permanently. The
second break could be associated with two large oil shocks in the 1970s.
The first covariance matrix break in 1850 very likely reflects a ”revolution” in British free
trade policy. There were many important events around this time, well known one is the Repeal
of the Corn Laws in 1846 (see Irwin, 1988, among others). In the subsequent years the UK
enjoyed a period of historic stability (panel B of Table 5). 1869 break could be associated with
the US signal about future world monetary regime. The 1869 Public Credit Act of the US stated
that bondholders who purchased bonds to help finance the Civil War (1861-1865) would be paid
back in gold. Prior to that US was undecided as to whether it should operate on a greenback,
gold, or bimetallic standard. Thus the Law was an early indicator that the country was moving
toward reinstating the gold standard. After this break the volatility of both inflation and short
rate declined (panel B of Table 5). 1951 covariance break marks the end of uncertainty and
volatility associated with world wars and marks the beginning of the post-WWII stability.
Although our model is too simple to explain causality, the 1989 break perhaps reflects
changes in monetary policy not only in the UK but also around the world. The confidence
interval is admittedly rather loose, reflecting the turmoil of that period. In 1993, the then
chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan told Congress: ”The historical relation-
ships between money and income, and between money and the price level have largely broken
down, depriving the aggregates of much of their usefulness as guides to policy.” The Bank of
England tried to target money supply and exchange rates in the 1980s and early 90s. In 1990
UK joined the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM), a system that kept currency fluctu-
ations within limited bands. But on September 16, 1992 UK was forced to withdraw the pound
sterling from the ERM and in few weeks came the adoption of inflation targeting.
The above results are based on VAR(2) model. When we use HQ to select the lag length this
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is estimated to be 1. The identified break datas from this smaller model are 1913 and 1977 for
the VAR coefficients and 1885, 1913, 1932, 1951 and 1990 for the variance covariance matrix11.
In fact, given the number of parameters is twice fever than VAR(2) the maximum number of
breaks was set to 5 with 15% trimming, not 3 as in VAR(2). However, one lag was too short to
take account of the whole dynamic structure: wild-bootstrapped p-value for the absence of 4th
order residual autocorrelation is 7% for the model estimated using data 1822-1913 and p-value
for the absence of 1st order residual autocorrelation is 1.3% between 1914-1977. Thus we had
to increase the lag order to 2 which helps remove all the evidence of residual autocorrelation.
It may be noted that Bataa et al.’s (2013) iterative procedure converges quickly, after just
3 iterations.
5.2 Breaks in persistence and Granger causality
Conditional on the VAR coefficient breaks in the earlier table, Panel A of Table 4 reports
on the origins of these breaks. Columns under the heading ”Dependent variable” represent
VAR equations. The first value (in bold) of each cell (in each column) reports the difference
between the sum of the autoregressive coefficients after and before the break date, with this
placed against the dates of the second subsample used in the comparison. Subsamples are those
implied by the estimated structural break dates of Table 3. The first value in each cell in panel
B reports the sum of estimated coefficients over the indicated subsample. In both cases, the
values below are bootstrap p-values (expressed as percentages) for the null hypothesis that the
corresponding true value is 0. If an individual coefficient break is not significant at 15% in
panel A, the corresponding subsample coefficients are restricted to be equal in panel B. Two
and one stars and a spade indicate significance at 5%, 10% and 15% respectively using wild
bootstrapped p-value.
We see that persistence increases for all three series in 1916, which is around WWI. The
difference between the sum of autoregressive coefficient after and before this date is highly
significant for short rate (p − value of insignificance is 3.34%) and is significant at 10% for
growth rate and inflation. Persistence, defined as the sum of autoregressive coefficients, becomes
significant only after that break, as can be seen from Panel B. Increased persistence in the short
rate is in line with our univariate analysis in section 3.2 although the multivariate analysis picks
up the break earlier. Notice that the univariate analysis fails to detect a persistence break in
11Not reported in the table but available upon request.
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both inflation and growth rate. There is no statistically significant evidence that the persistence
further changing in 1975. This is in contrast to a large literature that documents a decline in
inflation persistence in 1970s using monthly CPI (see e.g. Benati, 2008b, and Bataa, et al 2013,
2014, among others).
In 1916 the way inflation is Granger-caused by growth changes, the causality becoming
insignificant from being highly inflationary. There is no reverse Granger causality. Short rate
Granger causality by growth looses significance between 1917 and 1975. The causality is very
strong since then, perhaps reflecting an activist monetary policy aimed at supporting real
economic growth. On the other hand higher short rate always affects growth negatively. Short
rate starts to Granger cause inflation since 1917. On the other hand there is quite strong
evidence against inflation Granger causing short rate since 1976 12 .
5.3 Breaks in volatility and correlation
Table 5 identifies the origins of the covariance matrix breaks, whether they are from volatility
breaks and/or correlation breaks and provides corresponding subsample estimates. The values
reported are the final ones computed in the respective general to specific procedures. Conditional
on the significant correlation breaks the table also provides instantaneous causality test results.
Individual VAR coefficient breaks that are significant at least at 15% are allowed to change
while the others are estimated using the whole sample in estimating the VAR residuals and,
subsequently, the variance covariance matrix.
The first column of panel A reports the significance of structural break tests for diagonal
elements of the covariance matrix of the VAR (volatility) and the second column for off-diagonal
elements i.e., the correlation matrix, showing bootstrap p-values for the test of no change over
adjacent covariance matrix subsamples identified in Table 3, with the result placed against the
dates of the covariance matrix break date.
There is overwhelming evidence that the latest of the variance-covariance matrix breaks
12When we enforce all the coefficients break at the system-wide break dates the growth shows no persistence
until as late as 1976 and only since then there is Granger causality from the short rate, although it is significant
only at 10%. This contradicts with the inference derived allowing for only significant breaks, where the growth
persistence is detected earlier and the short rate always Granger causes it. Moreover the Granger causality from
the short rate to the inflation is detected only since 1975, much later than in B. If one ignores all the breaks
then firstly economically and statistically important persistence changes will also be ignored. Moreover, a strong
Granger causality from the growth to the inflation prior to the WWI will be diluted. A period when growth did
not Granger cause short rate will also be missed. Furthermore, that fact that short rate is caused by inflation
between 1917 and 1975 will disappear. Finally, inflation will never be Granger caused by the short rate, which
is hard to justify given the activist monetary policy in recent period.
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is not a volatility break. But there is equally strong evidence that this break in 1989 is an
important correlation break. 1914, as a correlation break, is significant only at 10% while the
remaining variance-covariance matrix breaks are unlikely to be associated with correlation13.
Panels B and C show sup-sample estimates of residual standard deviations and correlations
and also those ignoring the breaks [in square brackets]. Between 1915 and 1951, a period
that includes both world wars, growth and inflation are most volatile, but post war stability is
remarkable (standard deviations are 1.49% and 2.15% respectively), even compared with their
long term values (2.51% and 2.83%). In contrast short rate volatility almost doubles: standard
deviation is 1.14% after 1951 compared to 0.77% immediately before it and 0.67% during the
classical Gold Standard. Correlation between growth and inflation more than doubles after 1990
and that of between growth rate and short rate triples. Most strikingly, the correlation between
the short rate and inflation increases ten-fold from a very low base (from 4.8% to 48.1%) and
is extremely high by historical standard (9.4%).
Panel D contains no-instantaneous causality test results before and after 1990 and also those
ignoring this significant correlation break. Growth is contemporaneously uncorrelated with both
inflation and short rate before this break. If this break is ignored one would have missed this
important fact. Both inflation and short rate however are always instantaneously caused by
others in the system.
5.4 Impulse responses
A useful qualitative comparison is provided by the impulse responses computed across sub-
samples. What is allowed to change across subsamples is however important. In terms of the
VAR coefficients we are going to be quite liberal and allow for breaks that are significant at
15% in Panel A of Table 4. With regards to the five variance-covariance matrix breaks we are
not considering 1989 as a volatility break, but it is the only correlation break, as discussed in
the previous sub-section.
Figures 1-3 show generalized impulse responses of three variables over ten years after a one
percentage point shock. Rows indicate the variables that respond to the shock. Dotted and
131914 break looses its 10% significance as a correlation break when Granger causality is imposed. It becomes
impossible to make a clear-cut inference about the sources of the variance-covariance matrix if one unnecessarily
splits the sample or ignores altogether important structural breaks in the VAR coefficients. It appears imposing
constant VAR parameters results in spurious correlation breaks more often than such volatility breaks. Further
imposition of Granger causality also appears to play some role with respect to inferences about correlation breaks.
Nonetheless it was very clear even from these analyses that correlation from 1990 onward is very different from
than before. Details are available from the authors upon request.
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dashed lines (in blue) with shaded confidence intervals assume parameter constancy. A response
in solid (red) line with dotted confidence interval is specific to the sub-regime specified on the
top. For each plot two-standard-deviation wide confidence interval is obtained using a recursive
design wild bootstrap procedure. The columns represents the sub-samples defined by the break
dates in Tables 4 and 5.
5.4.1 Growth shock
The first thing to note from Figure 1 is that a growth shock does not exhibit strong persistence
using the full-sample model with no breaks. There is some increase in the effect of the shock
from 1% to about 1.25% for year 1 and 2 following the shock. However, the impact of this
growth shock dissipates quickly and the net effect of the shock is little more than the initial
shock of 1%. Hence the only long run impact on output is a shift equal to the magnitude of the
initial shock but no change in the long-run growth rate of output.
The persistence of a growth shock differs somewhat across regimes when structural breaks
are accounted for. The pre-1917 responses are weaker and the post-1975 responses are somewhat
stronger. Pre-1917, the initial 1% shock partially reverses and the cumulative response by year
4 is about 0.6%, where the response stabilises; the long-run effect (by year 10) is statistically
less than the initial shock and statistically less than the full-sample point estimate. For the
post-1975 sample the response follows a similar path to the full-sample in the first couple of
years, but from year 5 onwards there is a clear positive trend to the response; the post-1975
responses also have wide confidence intervals and hence the estimated response is not different
to that of the full sample.
Our empirical analysis finds that a real growth shock has a positive impact on the short-term
interest rate for the full sample period (using the simple / baseline model). The magnitude of
the effect is very modest, it is cumulatively about 0.7% (1.1%) after 5 (10) years, which equates
to an average rise of about 0.12% (0.11%) in the level of short rate from an initial 1.0% growth
shock. However, after allowing for structural breaks our analysis paints rather a different
picture for the relationship between real growth and short-term interest rates. Firstly, there
is a very weak response of short-term interest rates to growth in the pre-1975 sub-samples;
here the cumulative impact on the short rate is less than 0.6%, which implies an average rise
of not more than 0.12% in the short rate for years 1-5 and no impact on the short rate for
years 6-10. Secondly, the effects of growth shocks on interest rates are much more apparent
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for the 1976-1989 and 1990-2014 sub-periods. The magnitude of the effect for 1990-2014 peaks
at approaching 7% in year 10 and is about 4.8% by year 5; this indicates an average rise in
the short rate of 0.96% for the first 5 years which declines to about an average of 0.44% for
years 6-10. This suggests that short rates are substantially more responsive to growth shocks
in the most recent sub-sample (1990-2014) compared to the full sample. The strong response
of short-term rates to growth during the 1990-2014 period is also somewhat surprising given
that this period is mainly characterised by the Bank of England following an inflation targeting
regime during which it is primarily supposed to be focusing on maintaining price stability rather
than responding strongly to fluctuations in growth! However, we should note that it is plausible
that this partly reflects the anticipated impact of a growth shock on inflation. Further, the
1990-2014 sub-sample responses are somewhat stronger but not significantly different from the
1976-1989 period suggesting that the responsiveness of interest rates to growth shocks has not
increased dramatically since the 1970s.
[INSERT: FIGURE 1]
We now examine the impact of a real growth shock on inflation. Using the simple model
estimated over the full sample period the IRFs indicate that a real growth shock has a positive
cumulative impact on the inflation for the full sample period (using the simple / baseline model),
this can be interpreted as leading to a permanent increase in the price level. The magnitude
of the effect is fairly moderate; it is cumulatively about 1.25% (1.5%) after 5 (10) years, which
equates to an average rise of about 0.25% (0.15%) in the level of inflation from an initial 1.0%
growth shock. Thus it seems that a growth shock does stimulate some demand-pull inflation
which is apparent up until around year 5. This is interesting given the more modest impact of
the growth shock on growth itself after year 2.
It seems as if the general effect of demand-pull inflation is evident during all the sub-sample
periods. The point estimate effect stabilises more quickly for the pre-1917 sub-periods (by year
4) at typically a slightly weaker magnitude for the full sample. For the 1917-1951 and 1952-
1975 the response cumulates to about 2% and continues to increase, albeit modestly, through
until year 10. However, the sub-sample with the largest difference to the full-sample is 1990-
2014; here the response of inflation to growth shocks is much stronger initially and peaks at
around 3% in year 5-6 but then slightly reduces over the last few years. Especially in the years
immediately following the shock the effect is almost double for 1990-2014 compared to the full
sample; the (cumulated) inflation response reaches almost 2.5% by the end of year 3 which
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equates to inflation on average being more than 0.83% higher during years 1-3. Thus overall
there is evidence consistent with demand-pull inflation being at work in the UK economy, which
is especially strong during the 1990-2014 sub-period.
5.4.2 Inflation shock
Figure 2 depicts IRFs to a 1% inflation shock. UK inflation shocks for the full-sample model
are quite persistent for the first five years but then have a modest additional impact beyond
year five. In particular in the baseline model the shock seems to have a cumulated increase
on inflation (an impact on the price level) of about 2.5% by year 5, with the effect seeming to
get smaller each year. After year 5 there the cumulated response of inflation rises modestly, by
about 0.4% in total over years 6-10 (i.e. about a 0.1% increase in inflation per year).
However, there is some time-variation in the effect. Prior to 1917, the effect of an inflation
shock on inflation is substantially weaker and peaks in year 1 at a cumulated increase of about
1.5% before slightly dissipating. Hence, during this period there appears to be no long-term
effect on the price level. However, in the later sub-samples the an inflation shock has more
of a persistent effect and peaks around year 5 at a cumulated response of about 3% and then
is approximately flat for years 6-10. The main message from this is that inflation shocks in
general primarily have a medium-term effect on subsequent inflation after the initial shock, i.e.
the second round and third round consequences of inflation shocks tend to be rather substantial.
However, after year 5 there is little evidence that inflation continues to cumulate upwards.
In contrast, for post 1917 sub-samples the response of inflation to an inflation shock is
somewhat stronger than the full sample. In the first 5 years the impact exceeds 3% and continues
rising (albeit at a slower rate) until at least year 8. Nevertheless the post 1917 responses are not
statistically different from the full sample. This evidence corroborates the US results of Fuhrer
and Moore (1995) that there is high inflation persistence post-WWII and we provide novel
evidence from IRFs. Our results suggest that this high inflation persistence actually dates back
to 1917 in the UK; this high persistence of annual inflation over the last century is apparent
across different monetary regimes and hence is not entirely consistent with Benati (2008a) who
using quarterly change in inflation reports some variation across different settings e.g. less
persistence in the UK following the introduction of inflation targeting. The last 14 years of the
Gold standard (1917-1931), we find are characterized by higher inflation persistence; however,
consistent with Benati we find that inflation persistence was lower in earlier periods prior to
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1917, when the Gold standard was also in force. Hence our results broadly suggest that it is
not a change in monetary regime that is the source of high inflation persistence.
Our empirical analysis finds that an inflation shock has a tiny impact on the short-term
interest rate for the full sample period (using the simple / baseline model). The magnitude of
the effect is very modest, reaching a cumulated effect of about 0.4% by year 5, and gradually
increasing to about 0.6% by year 10. Thus the response of the nominal short-term interest to
an inflation shock is much smaller than one would expect under the Fisher hypothesis where
the effect should be 1:1 (if the shock were permanent); for example a 1% inflation shock leads to
an increase in the nominal short rate of less than 0.1% p.a. This appears to be consistent with
prior literature that the response on interest rates to inflation is less than unity (for example
Mishkin, 1992; Evans and Lewis, 1995). This also suggests that this key monetary policy
tool is not adjusting sufficiently to counteract the effect of inflation shocks since an interest
rate response greater than unity would be necessary to induce a fall in inflation in the future.
Finally, there are no significant long-run effects in the UK which appears inconsistent with the
post-war results of Rapach (2003) but consistent with money neutrality, this is evidenced by the
stabilising of the cumulated response function of the interest rate at an approximately constant
level in the later years and this not being statistically different from zero.
Crucially when structural breaks are allowed for then there are key differences. Prior to 1976,
IRF’s are broadly similar to the full sample period. However, for 1976-1989 and especially
for the 1990-2014 sub-period there are striking differences. For 1990-2014, there is a much
stronger response of the short rate to the inflation shock than during the full sample period; the
cumulated response continues to rise throughout the sample period reaching about 5% by year
10, in contrast to about 0.6% for the full sample model. Thus, there is substantial adjustment
of interest rates to inflation during this period. It suggests that during 1990-2014 a 1% inflation
shock would lead to about a 0.7% average rise in short rate for the first 5 years and this would
remain on average about 0.2% p.a. above the initial level for years 6-10. These results are
also statistically different from those reported for the full sample. Nevertheless even during
this time money growth targeting (during the 1980s) and inflation targeting (from 1997) were
implemented, but yet we find that there is a less than a unity response to the inflation shock in
the short-term. This seems rather surprising since one would expect the nominal interest rate
would need to adjust by more than unity in order to counter-balance the effect of the inflation
shock.
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What happens to real growth following an inflation shock? According to the no break
model estimated over the full sample period there is a modest impact; the IRFs indicate that
an inflation shock has a moderate impact over the first five years leading to an output loss of
about 0.2% in total (cumulative growth loss), which are strongest in years 2 and 3. However,
from year 5 onwards there is (essentially) no further decline in output but little increase either.
These results for the full sample suggest that an inflation shock has a very modest impact
on growth in the medium term and leads to a permanent loss of output of less than 0.25%.
Furthermore the IRF is not statistically different from 0 at any point during the 10 year period.
Thus, there is limited support overall for the view that inflation costs growth from this no break
model.
Nevertheless, the results differ somewhat when structural breaks are modelled. For 1952-
1975 we find a stronger negative response of cumulated growth to an inflation shock, which
hits a trough at about -0.4% (-0.5%) by year 5 (10), although the effect is not statistically
distinguishable from 0. In contrast for 1990-2014 there is a very weak response of growth to an
inflation shock which never cumulates to a loss of more than 0.2% and indicates an increase in
growth from year 3 onwards.
One plausible reason for a positive response of growth to inflation is if the inflation is caused
by external i.e. international factors, which indicate strong global demand and hence strong
sales of domestic output overseas. This is more likely during the post world war II era given the
almost exponential growth in trade and the growing international economic interdependency
during this period.
Interestingly, we find evidence generally in favour of long-run money neutrality here since
there is no significant long-run effect on the rate of growth and a fairly modest and insignificant
long-run effect on the level of output.
5.4.3 Nominal short rate shock
Figure 3 indicates that UK short rate shocks for the full-sample model are rather persistent
and the cumulated increase in the short rate continues through until year 10; in other words
the interest rate remains above its pre-shock level even after 10 years. However, the short rate
does gradually mean-revert, which is evidenced by the increase in the cumulative effect getting
smaller as time progresses. The cumulated effect of the shock is about 2.5% after two years,
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rising to about 4% after five years and about 5% by year ten.
However, the effect does vary over time. Prior to 1917, the effect of a short-term shock on
itself is substantially weaker and peaks after just two or three years at a cumulated increase of
about 2% and remaining at this level thereafter. This suggests that prior to 1917 the short-term
rate itself reverts from the shock within three years; hence during this period there appears to
be no long-term effect on the level of the short rate. However, in the other sub-samples the
short-term rate shock has a longer lasting impact. For 1917-1951 and 1952-1975 it broadly
resembles the full sample, but is slightly weaker, whilst for 1976-1989 it closely resembles the
full sample and 1990-2014 the effect is somewhat intensified such that the cumulated response
reaches more than 8% by the end of year 10. Thus, it is clear that the short-term rate is highly
persistent for the most recent periods but was not very persistent at all prior to WWI.
A nominal short term rate shock has a negative effect on growth for the full sample model;
however, the impact is generally weak and statistically insignificant. The effect of a 1% shock
to interest rate for the full sample has a cumulative impact on growth which is never greater
than 0.5% magnitude in absolute terms. It is also never statistically different from 0, which
suggests there are no significant long-run effects. This suggests that the effectiveness of this key
monetary policy tool to stimulate economic activity is limited.
However, the sub-sample analysis reveals a somewhat different picture. Our model that
accounts for structural breaks indicates that between WWI and the 1970s (for the 1917-1951
and especially 1952-1975 sub-periods) the use of an increase in interest rate to dampen economic
activity may have been effective. For the 1952-1975 sub-period in the short-term (for the first
two years) there is a sharp negative response of growth to a short rate shock of about -1.5% which
then diminishes but the cumulative impact on growth reaches -2.25% by year 5 and -3% by year
10. These results for 1952-1975 are statistically significant as well as economically substantial.
Our results suggest there is a statistically significant negative long-run effect apparent after 10
years. Hence, the interest rate could have been an effective tool for managing growth in the UK
economy during the aftermath of WWII.
However, in the later part of our sample (1976-1989 and 1990-2014) there is very little evi-
dence that a short rate shock has a substantial negative effect on growth. The point estimates of
output losses are never more than 0.6%. Actually for 1990-2014 point estimates suggest output
gains not losses from a short rate shock, although these are not statisitcally distinguishable
from 0. Hence, unexpected monetary policy shocks are almost totally ineffective over this re-
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cent period in stimulating or constraining the economy. Further, it suggests that the perceived
wisdom of a strong correlation of short-term interest rates with real output (e.g. Bernanke and
Blinder, 1992; Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991) does not hold over recent years. This raises the
question of which policy tools are there nowadays that will actually assist the Bank of England
in prudently managing the domestic economy. The finding of no long-run effect of interest
rate on growth seems consistent with Haug and Dewald (2011) who report money growth is
unrelated to output growth at longer horizons.
Another issue is that for the majority of the 1990-2014 period the UK was following inflation
targeting (or monetary growth targeting) and hence growth concerns should not have been
forefront in policymakers minds. Nevertheless, we saw in Figure 1 that nominal interest rates
respond to growth during all periods especially since the 1970s. Hence the evidence from Figure
3 suggests that if the interest rate was rising out of macroeconomic management concerns then
it may not have been meeting its objectives of stabilising growth.
[INSERT: FIGURE 3]
We now examine the impact of an interest rate shock on inflation. The conventional view
is that a rise in interest rates leads to lower inflation, ceteris paribus. A shock to the nominal
short term rate has a modest positive effect on inflation which peaks within the first few years.
The base model estimated over the full sample period shows that the IRFs indicate that the
a nominal rate shock has a positive impact on inflation especially during the first three years
reaches a cumulative effect of +2% and then peaking at a cumulative effect of about +2.5%
by year 10. According to the point estimates this is statistically significant from 0 almost
throughout the 10-year horizon examined. This is somewhat surprising given that an increase
in the short term rate is conventionally thought to lead to reductions in inflation. However,
these results are consistent with the price puzzle (Sims, 1992).
A couple more observations are pertinent which add to price puzzle literature. First, for
the pre-1915 sub-samples the price puzzle is weaker. It peaks after the first year at never more
than +1.5%. Second for sub-sample periods for 1917-1951, 1952-1975 and 1990-2014 the effect
of a short-term interest rate shock are much stronger than for the full sample and reach a peak
of at least 5% by year 5 and even approach 10% for the 1917-1951 period. Our results are not
entirely consistent with Hanson’s (2004) US evidence on the price puzzle which suggests the
price puzzle is concentrated in the 1959-1979 sub-period rather than post 1980. Our UK results
suggest the price puzzle is strongest for 1917-1951, and of similar magnitude for 1952-1975 and
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1990-2014, but weak over 1976-1989. Hence, there appears cross-country variation in the nature
of the price puzzle.
Furthermore, the existence of the price puzzle in our data could be attributed as suggested
by Balke and Emery (1994) to an insufficient adjustment of the short rate to high inflation.
That is the movement in the nominal short rate may not be sufficient to counteract the rise in
inflation, in such a scenario the real interest rate will fall (not rise) which may help explain why
inflation tends to increase rather than decrease following a nominal short rate rise.
5.5 Forecast error variance decompositions
A comparison of forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD) over sub-periods also sheds
light on the the changes in British economy over the last two hundred years. We also provide
various connectedness measures based on FEVD.
Table 6 uses generalized VAR for the UK14 Connectedness tables are provided for two
horizons: h =1 and 4 years15. The ijth entry of the upper-left 3 × 3 series submatrix gives
the ijth pairwise directional connectedness; i.e., the percent of forecast error variance of series
i due to shocks from series j. They are allowed to be different over the sub-samples defined
by the statistically significant structural breaks. If bootstrap one (two) standard deviation(s)
wide confidence interval does not contain zero they are marked with *(**). The quantities
estimated over the whole sample, ignoring the structural breaks are in square brackets. The
rightmost (From others) column gives total directional connectedness (from); i.e., row sums
(from all others to i). The bottom (To others) row gives total directional connectedness (to);
i.e., column sums (to all others from j). Next (Net) row gives the difference in total directional
connectedness (to-from). The far-right columns give the total connectedness ’from others’ and
the rows below the short rate give the total connectedness ’to’ others. The bottommost row
also gives bi-variate spillovers.
5.5.1 Forecast error variance decomposition results
The first column in each section of Table 6 reports results for the FEVDs when the initial shock
occurs (i.e. the period 0 shock). We consider movements of each variable in turn. The point
14A table that relies on Cholseky orthogonalization is available from the authors upon request and is omitted
here conserve space. The variable ordering is first economic growth, then inflation and finally short term interest
rate.
15There is not much movement after 4 years of the shock and essentially converges.
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estimates is that growth shocks account for 98.9% of the future movement in growth whereas
only 1.0% is from inflation and 0.1% from the short rate. Moreover, with two standard deviation
confidence intervals provided we cannot reject the hypotheses that i) growth shock accounts for
100% of the movement in growth, ii) inflation accounts for 0% of the movement in growth and
iii) the short rate accounts for 0% of movement in growth. This underlines that over the full
sample period the evolution of growth is almost entirely determined by shocks to growth itself.
The sub-period analysis for growth broadly supports the main findings of the full sample at the
1 year horizon except for the latest sub-period (1990-2014). For 1990-2014, there are a several
pertinent differences. First, the amount attributable to the growth shock, falls substantially
to 70.5%. Second, the amount attributable to inflation increases to 9.7%, which is more than
other sub-periods (2.1%) and the full-sample (1.0%); nevertheless none of these are statistically
different from zero when the two standard deviation confidence interval is used. Thirdly, the
variance attributable to the short rate is tiny pre-1989 (0.4%) but rises dramatically for the
post-1990 sample to 19.8% and becomes statistically different from zero.
Estimates for inflation at the one year horizon indicate that this is also primarily determined
by shocks to itself. Point estimates are above 90% for the full sample and above 85% for all
sub-periods except 1990-2014. Growth shocks, perhaps surprisingly have very little effect on
movements in inflation, at least initially; point estimates are never more than 2% and never
statistically different from 0 apart from during 1990-2014, when this rises to 7.3% but is not
different from zero using a two standard deviation confidence band. In contrast, short rate
shocks do have an impact on inflation where point estimates are always more than 7.5%. Short
rate shocks are statistically different from 0 at the 5% level (two SD band) for the full-sample
and all sub-periods. Since 1990 short rate shocks can account for 39.6% of the movement in
inflation (one year ahead).
Estimates for the short rate indicate that one year ahead deviations from the model forecast
is also primarily determined by shocks to itself for the full sample and almost all sub-periods.
Point estimates are always above 90%, with the exception of the 1990-2014 sub-sample. Growth
shocks, perhaps very surprisingly, have very little effect on movements in the short rate, at
least initially; (prior to 1990) point estimates are never more than 0.5% and never statistically
different from 0. In contrast, inflation shocks do have an impact on inflation where point
estimates are always more than 7.5%. Inflation shocks are statistically different from 0 at the
5% level (two SD band) for the full-sample and all sub-periods. Since 1990 inflation shocks can
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account for 36.8% of the movement in the short-rate and growth shocks can account for 13.8%;
thus, together they can explain 50.6% of the variation in the short-rate since 1990, while the
short rate itself explains less than half (49.4%).
The second column of each sub-section of Table 6 reports results for the 4-year forecast
horizon (h=4). The empirical results here show some important differences relative to the 1-
year forecasts. In general, at the 4-year horizon, less of the variation is determined by the
variable itself, although there is more variation in sub-periods, the results for the 1990-2014
sub-period are typically amongst the lowest. For growth, shocks to growth itself explain above
90% of variance for the full-sample (also this declines from 98.9% at h=1 to 90.6% at h=4).
In most sub-periods growth shocks explain more than 90% of the variance, although this is
below 65% for 1851-1869, 1952-1975 and 1990-2014. These sub-sample reductions for growth
are accompanied by an increase in importance of the short rate for each of these sub-periods; in
fact the short rate can explain more than 20% of the 4-year FEVD for growth in each of these
3 sub-periods (1851-1869, 1952-1975 and 1990-2014) and these are significantly different from
0 (using two SD band). In contrast, the contribution of inflation is only statistically different
from 0 during the 1990-2014 sub-period (using two SD band) when it can explain 17.4% of the
variance of growth. Thus, this suggests that for the recent period (1990-2014) both short rate
shocks and inflation shocks have important effects on growth during this period and that the
central bank should bear this in mind when formulating monetary policy.
The empirical results for inflation FEVD at the 4-year horizon show some key differences
relative to the 0-year forecasts. First, less than 85% of the error variance is attributable to
inflation shocks itself for the full sample and for all sub-periods. The point estimate is 82.7%
for the full sample but is substantially lower at less than 50% for the 1952-1975 and 1990-
2014 sub-samples. We can also now reject for the full sample that 0% of the error variance is
attributable to the short rate during post 1917 sub-periods and it can explain more than 15% of
variance during these sub-periods. Prior to 1916, Growth can explain more than 20% of the 4-
year forecast error for inflation in almost all sub-periods (apart from 1851-1869, when it is 7.1%).
For 1990-2014, less than 50% of the 4-year inflation FEVD is explained by inflation itself, with
39.8% explained by the short-rate and 12.9% explained in growth. Thus, it appears that short
rate shocks are an increasingly important determinant of inflation during this period and that
monetary policymakers nowadays may be able to use the short rate to influence inflation. In
contrast, prior to 1915 the short-rate had a very modest ability to explain variation in inflation.
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[INSERT: TABLE 6]
The FEVD empirical results for the short rate at the 4-year horizon show similarities with
those for growth and inflation. Less than 100% of the error variance is attributable to short
rate shocks itself for the full sample and for almost all sub-periods. The point estimate is 79.4%
for the full sample but shows considerable variation during sub-samples being less than 50%
for the 1823-1850, 1915-1916 and 1990-2014 sub-samples. We can also now reject for the full
sample that 0% of the error variance is attributable to inflation or to growth. Growth now has
a statistically significant impact on the short rate in most sub-samples (especially 1823-1850
and post-1976) and the full sample. Inflation can explains more than 10% of the 4-year forecast
error of the short rate during all sub-periods except 1917-1951 and 1952-1975. This seems to
suggest in general that the short rate in the medium term is responsive to both growth rate
shocks than inflation shocks. Even during the 1990-2014 sub-sample, when the central bank is
supposed to have been following an inflation targeting (or money growth targeting) policy, it
seems that the short rate has been responding almost equally to both short rate shocks and
inflation shocks.
The final columns of Table 6 report the volatility spillovers from the other economic variables.
For example, for growth at the 1-year horizon (h=1) only 1.1% of the forecast error variance
is attributable to spillovers from other variables only if one ignores the breaks (inflation or the
short rate). However, for the 1990-2014 sub-period it is as high as 29.5% demonstrating much
larger spillovers in recent years. At the 1-year horizon a similar pattern is also apparent for
inflation and short rate; in general about 10% of error variance is attributable to spillovers but
this rises to about 50% for 1990-2014.
The ”To others” rows of Table 6 give the volatility spillovers from the variable of interest
to other variables. There is further evidence that at the 1-year horizon that spillovers greatly
increased for the post-1990 sample. Firstly, spillovers to other variables from growth are less
than 2.5% in all periods except 1990-2014 where they are more than 20%. Secondly, spillover
to other variables from inflation or the short rate are about 10% in all periods except 1990-2014
where they are at least 45%. The ”Net” rows give the difference between the ”To others” and
”From others” segments. In general these values are very close to each other for the 1-year
horizon forecast errors, except for the 1990-2014 sub-period. During the latest sub-period it
seems as if there are substantially higher spillovers (almost 9%) given to other variables by the
short rate than those received from other variables. This is primarily offset by growth giving
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substantially lower spillovers to other variables than it received.
The ”Bi-variate” rows indicate that there is virtually no volatility spillover at 1 year horizon
to the growth from either the short rate ore the inflation up until 1990 when the spillover
becomes significant. The net bi-variate volatility spillover is from the short rate to the inflation
and again this becomes significant only since 1990. These changes are in contrast to the constant
parameter model inferences reported in square brackets.
The total spillover index is 5.73% if one ignores all the VAR coefficient and covariance matrix
breaks but hugely rises to 42.33% for 1990-2014; this indicates that there were generally very
modest spillovers for the full sample but very substantial spillover over recent years. Thus these
economic variables are much more inter-connected nowadays and policy-makers should take this
into account when implementing macroeconomic management strategies.
The FEVD results at the four year horizon also indicate that there are volatility spillovers
which are strong in the post-1990 relationships. However, the main difference between the
one year horizon and four year horizon is that in some of the earlier samples there are also
substantial spillovers observed at the four year horizon. In the case of the 1976-1989, at the
four-year horizon the spillovers are consistently quite high regardless of the variable examined.
However, for other samples it tends to be the case that the high spillovers are confined to specific
variables; for example in the ”from others” section during the 1851-1869 there are relatively
large spillovers towards growth but more modest spillovers towards inflation or interest rate
during this sub-period. Hence these results suggest that pre-1990 spillover effects depend upon
the variables and the sub-periods examined rather than being consistently large as they are in
the post-1990 period.
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6 Conclusions
The main objective of this paper is to model the dynamic behavior of the short-term interest
rate, inflation and economic growth over the period 1820-2014 for the United Kingdom. Initially
we examine if there are structural breaks (of persistence, mean or volatility) in individual series
using the iterative procedure that was recently developed by Bataa, Osborn, Sensier and van
Dijk (2014). We then attempt to identify, in a multivariate context, if there has been any
structural breaks in the relationship between these variables using a vector autoregression (VAR)
model.
Our primary empirical analysis employs the generalized VAR methodology of Koop, Pesaran
and Potter (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), the forecast error variance decomposition
analysis of which is updated in Diebold and Yulmaz (2009, 2012, 2014). This is because our
data frequency is annual and covers an extended time span; it is important to allow for correlated
shocks in this context. We rely on generalized versions of the impulse responses and the forecast
error variance decompositions that are not sensitive to variable ordering.
For our multivariate analysis we use the recently developed methodology of Bataa, Osborn,
Sensier and van Dijk (2013). The main innovation of their methodology is that it allows for
changes in both the VAR parameters as well as the variance covariance matrix, but not neces-
sarily at the same time, a feature that is vital in our long term view. Then we examine if each
structural break is the result of a change in persistence, a break in Granger causality, a shift in
volatility or a change in correlation. Indeed, we find that one or a combination of these sources
are behind the structural breaks in a trivariate VAR of short term interest rates, inflation and
growth.
Most covariance matrix breaks can be primarily attributed to changes in volatility, although
these mainly occur prior to the end of WWI. We find that the persistence of all three variables
increases in 1917. There is also very strong evidence that the dynamic relationship between
the inflation and the short rate breaks down during the Great War; there is some evidence
Granger causality form the growth rate to the short rate also changed during this period. Our
results confirm earlier research that a great moderation occurred but suggests that the structural
change is apparent by 1952 in UK annual data. We do find a covariance matrix break in 1989
but this can be attributed to a break in correlation rather than a break in volatility. The finding
that there has been no significant structural break in the correlation between the short term
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interest rate, inflation and growth until 1989 is indeed one of the most interesting.
A key finding from our analysis is that the dynamic behaviour of our variables of interest
have been distinctly different in recent decades compared to earlier sub-samples. We find that
the short rate responds strongly to both growth post-1975 and to inflation since at least 1990.
However, short rate shocks do not have significant negative impacts either upon the growth rate
or inflation. The implication is that the effectiveness and role of the short term interest as a
tool for policymakers may need to be reconsidered. This is because neither inflation nor growth
appear to react significantly to interest rate shocks (at least not in the appropriate direction). In
fact we actually provide additional evidence of the price puzzle, a positive relationship between
short rate and inflation; this is not confined to post WWII but in our longer sample is apparent
since 1917.
Overall there is evidence of substantial structural change over time in the relationship be-
tween growth, inflation and the short rate. The primary findings are i) there is an increase in
persistence of all variables in 1917, ii) most covariance matrix breaks are attributable to vari-
ance shifts and iii) when a correlation break did occur this lead to a substantial intensification
of the responsiveness of the short rate to growth and inflation, which is observed for recent
decades. Consequently economic policymakers need to carefully monitor the linkages between
these variables and be prepared to adjust the way monetary tools are used when faced with
structural change.
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TABLE 2. UNIVARIATE ITERATIVE DECOMPOSITION
Short rate Inflation Growth
A. Outliers
Dates none 1921, 1922 none
B. Level component
Overall test 715.82** 115.37** 4.57
Seq(2/1) 390.16** 2.47
Seq(3/2) 6.07
Breaks 1931 [1929-1933] 1914 [1910-1918] none
1951 [1950-1952]
Regime means 3.28, 0.54, 6.01 -0.06, 5.10 2.01
(Ignoring breaks) (3.88) (2.60) (2.01)
C. Autoregressive coefficients
Overall test 21.34** [15.92] 10.50 [10.67] 8.82 [10.67]
Seq(2/1) 4.55 [16.58]
Breaks 1940 [1926-1954] none none
AIC, HQ, SIC 5,5,1 1,1,1 1,1,1
Regime persistence 0.54, 0.92 0.67 0.25
(Ignoring breaks) (0.87) (0.67) (0.25)
D. Volatility
Overall test 36.92** 24.95** 21.82**
Seq(2/1) 12.07** 6.89 17.52**
Seq(3/2) 10.58 10.49
Breaks 1931 [1894-1932] 1980 [1953-1983] 1918 [1915-1962]
1951 [1950-1986] 1946 [1908-1947]
St.Dev. across regimes 1.05, 0.24,1.56 3.55, 1.67 2.56, 4.60, 1.95
[Ignoring breaks] [1.19] [3.31] [2.78]
E. Number of iterations for convergence
Main and sub loop 4,3 6,2 3,2
Notes: Decomposition as in (1) using the iterative method of Bataa, Osborn, Seniser and van Dijk (2014), with
breaks detected using the Qu and Perron (2007) test using a 5% significance level (trimming 10% and maximum
of 8 breaks). 95% critical values are reported in square brackets for the autoregressive component case, as the
lag orders are different. For the level and volatility these are uniform, thus not reported. These uniform 95%
critical values of WDMax, Seq(2/1), Seq(3/2), Seq(4/3) are 10.67, 10.97, 11.88 and 12.49, respectively. Outliers
are defined as being 5 times the interquartile range from the median after removal of level breaks. The AR order
of the dynamic component is selected according to the Akaike (AIC) information criterion, and used at entry
to the dynamic/volatility sub-loop. Persistence is computed as the sum of the estimated AR coefficients within
the relevant dynamic regime, with the standard deviation of disturbances also shown within volatility regimes.
When breaks are detected, the estimated breaks dates are shown in bold together with their asymptotic 90%
confidence intervals in parentheses. Finally, the numbers required to achieve convergence of the loops of the
algorithm are shown.
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TABLE 3. ITERATIVE STRUCTURAL BREAK TEST RESULTS
VAR Coefficients Covariance matrix
Asymptotic WDmax test statistics [and critical values]
232.86** [42.63] 77.97** [22.59]
Asymptotic sequential test statistics [and critical values]
101.15** [41.93] 36.57** [23.23]
19.73 [43.72] 29.26** [24.15]
32.84** [24.77]
25.98** [25.26]
13.54 [25.70]
Break dates, confidence intervals (and bootstrap p-values)
1850 [1849-1851]
(0.00)
1869 [1866-1870]
(0.01)
1916 [1909-1921] 1914 [1913-1929]
(0.04) (0.05)
1951 [1949-1952]
(0.00)
1975 [1971-1978] 1989 [1972-1990]
(1.07) (1.88)
Notes: Values are reported are at convergence of the iterative procedure of Bataa, Osborn, Seniser and van Dijk
(2013). The overall test (WDMax) examines the null hypothesis of no break against an unknown number of
breaks, to a maximum number of breaks indicated in the first row. If the overall statistic is significant at 5%,
sequential tests (SeqF) are applied starting with the null hypothesis of one break and continuing until the relevant
statistic is not significant. Asymptotic critical values for the 5% significance level are reported [in square brackets]
and ** indicates the statistic is significant at this level. The estimated break dates and their 90% confidence
intervals [in square brackets] are also reported. Bootstrap p-values corresponding to the null hypothesis that a
break that is asymptotically significant is actually not are also reported in brackets.
TABLE 4. INDIVIDUAL COEFFICIENT BREAKS AND GRANGER CAUSALITY
A. Coefficient Break Tests B. Estimated Coefficients
Dependent variable Dependent variable
Subsample
Explana-
tory
Growth Inflation
Short
rate
Growth Inflation Short rate
1823-1916 Growth -0.15 0.66** 0.20**
31.02 0.03 0.10
1917-1975 0.61* -0.49** -0.12♠ 0.39** 0.19 0.08
8.62 2.58 13.97 0.79 84.26 10.26
1976-2014 0.06 -0.06 0.55** 0.55**
32.69 67.37 1.97 1.01
1823-1916 Inflation -0.07 0.34 0.08
89.30 14.12 10.88
1917-1975 -0.06 0.43* -0.10** 0.76** -0.02*
60.11 8.41 0.46 0.00 9.30
1976-2014 0.14 -0.04 0.15♠ 0.12
50.72 58.07 14.52 44.71
1823-1916 Short -0.24** 0.07 0.50
rate 3.85 22.12 19.96
1917-1975 0.15 0.21** 0.31** 0.13** 0.81**
21.37 1.60 3.34 2.58 0.00
1976-2014 0.31 -0.34 -0.01
16.70 36.63 52.64
Notes: Columns represent equations. The first value (in bold) of each cell in panel A reports the difference
between the sum of relevant coefficients after and before the break date, with this placed against the dates of the
second subsample used in the comparison. The first value in each cell in panel B reports the estimated coefficients
over the indicated subsample. In both cases, the values below are bootstrap p-values (expressed as percentages)
for the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal to 0. If an individual coefficient break is not significant at
15% in panel A, the corresponding subsample coefficients are restricted to be equal in panel B. Subsamples are
those implied by the estimated structural break dates of Table 3. Significant at **5%, *10%, ♠15%, using wild
bootstrap p-value.
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TABLE 6. GENERALIZED FEVD AND SPILLOVERS
Series Regimes Growth Inflation Short rate From others
h=1 h=4 h=1 h=4 h=1 h=4 h=1 h=4
Growth 1823-1850 97.5** 94.2** 2.1 3.8* 0.4 2.1* 2.5 5.8*
1851-1869 97.5** 61.4** 2.1 11.1* 0.4 27.4** 2.5 38.6**
1870-1914 97.5** 92.6** 2.1 3.9* 0.4 3.5* 2.5 7.4*
1915-1916 97.5** 93.8** 2.1 4.2* 0.4 2.0* 2.5 6.2*
1917-1951 97.5** 94.6** 2.1 2.2 0.4 3.2* 2.5 5.4*
1952-1975 97.5** 55.1** 2.1 5.5* 0.4 39.4** 2.5 44.9**
1976-1989 97.5** 77.6** 2.1 7.2* 0.4 15.2* 2.5 22.4**
1990-2014 70.5** 58.2** 9.7* 17.4** 19.8** 24.4** 29.5** 41.8**
[Ignoring breaks] [98.9**] [90.6**] [1.0] [4.0*] [0.1] [5.4*] [1.1] [9.4*]
Inflation 1823-1850 1.9 27.5** 89.8** 67.4** 8.3** 5.1* 10.2** 32.6**
1851-1869 1.9 7.5* 89.8** 84.6** 8.3** 7.9* 10.2** 15.4**
1870-1914 1.9 29.6** 89.8** 65.4** 8.3** 4.9* 10.2** 34.6**
1915-1916 1.9 22.3** 89.8** 72.1** 8.3** 5.6** 10.2** 27.9**
1917-1951 1.9 9.0* 89.8** 72.6** 8.3** 18.4** 10.2** 27.4**
1952-1975 1.9 3.8 89.8** 47.4** 8.3** 48.7** 10.2** 52.6**
1976-1989 1.9 9.0* 89.8** 76.2** 8.3** 14.8** 10.2** 23.8**
1990-2014 7.3* 12.9* 53.1** 47.3** 39.6** 39.8** 46.9** 52.7**
[Ignoring breaks] [0.9] [7.7*] [91.6**] [82.6**] [7.6**] [9.7**] [8.4**] [17.4**]
Short rate 1823-1850 0.4 37.9** 8.4** 18.8** 91.2** 43.3** 8.8** 56.7**
1851-1869 0.4 3.9* 8.4** 14.6** 91.2** 81.5** 8.8** 18.5**
1870-1914 0.4 25.7** 8.4** 15.8** 91.2** 58.6** 8.8** 41.4**
1915-1916 0.4 38.6** 8.4** 21.9** 91.2** 39.5** 8.8** 60.5**
1917-1951 0.4 15.0* 8.4** 7.9 91.2** 77.1** 8.8** 22.9*
1952-1975 0.4 1.4 8.4** 5.1* 91.2** 93.5** 8.8** 6.5*
1976-1989 0.4 28.2** 8.4** 16.6** 91.2** 55.2** 8.8** 44.8**
1990-2014 13.8* 28.1** 36.8** 30.9** 49.4** 41.1** 50.6** 58.9**
[Ignoring breaks] [0.1] [11.6**] [7.6**] [9.0**] [92.3**] [79.4**] [7.7**] [20.6**]
To others 1823-1850 2.3 65.4** 10.5** 22.6** 8.7** 7.1*
1851-1869 2.3 11.4* 10.5** 25.7** 8.7** 35.3**
1870-1914 2.3 55.3** 10.5** 19.6** 8.7** 8.4*
1915-1916 2.3 60.9** 10.5** 26.1** 8.7** 7.6**
1917-1951 2.3 24.0* 10.5** 10.1* 8.7** 21.6**
1952-1975 2.3 5.2 10.5** 10.7* 8.7** 88.2**
1976-1989 2.3 37.2** 10.5** 23.9** 8.7** 30.0**
1990-2014 21.2* 40.9** 46.5** 48.2** 59.3** 64.3**
[Ignoring breaks] [1.0] [19.3**] [8.6**] [13.0**] [7.6**] [15.0**]
Net 1823-1850 -0.2 59.6** 0.3 -10.0 -0.1 -49.6**
1851-1869 -0.2 -27.1* 0.3 10.3 -0.1 16.8
1870-1914 -0.2 48.0** 0.3 -15.0* -0.1 -33.0**
1915-1916 -0.2 54.7** 0.3 -1.8 -0.1 -52.9**
1917-1951 -0.2 18.6* 0.3 -17.3* -0.1 -1.3
1952-1975 -0.2 -39.7** 0.3 -41.9** -0.1 81.6**
1976-1989 -0.2 14.8 0.3 0.1 -0.1 -14.9
1990-2014 -8.3** -0.9 -0.4 -4.5 8.7** 5.3
[Ignoring breaks] [-0.1] [10.0] [0.1] [-4.4] [-0.1] [-5.5]
Bi-variate Growth & Inflation Growth & Short rate Inflation & Short rate Index
1823-1850 0.2 -23.7** 0.0 -35.8** -0.1 -13.8* 7.2** 31.7**
1851-1869 0.2 3.6 0.0 23.5* -0.1 -6.7 7.2** 24.2**
1870-1914 0.2 -25.8** 0.0 -22.2** -0.1 -10.8* 7.2** 27.8**
1915-1916 0.2 -18.1* 0.0 -36.6** -0.1 -16.3* 7.2** 31.5**
1917-1951 0.2 -6.8 0.0 -11.8 -0.1 10.5 7.2** 18.6**
1952-1975 0.2 1.7 0.0 38.0** -0.1 43.6** 7.2** 34.7**
1976-1989 0.2 -1.8 0.0 -13.0 -0.1 -1.9 7.2** 30.3**
1990-2014 2.4** 4.5 5.9** -3.6 2.8* 9.0* 42.3** 51.1**
[Ignoring breaks] [0.1] [-3.7] [0.0] [-6.2] [-0.1] [0.7] [5.7**] [15.8**]
Notes: Connectedness table for two horizons: h =1,2. The ijth entry of the upper-left 3× 3 series submatrix gives the ijth pairwise
directional connectedness; i.e., the percent of forecast error variance of series i due to shocks from series j. They are allowed to be
different over the sub-samples defined by the statistically significant structural breaks. If bootstrap one (two) standard deviation(s)
wide confidence interval does not contain zero they are marked with *(**). The quantities estimated over the whole sample, ignoring
the structural breaks are in square brackets. The rightmost (From others) column gives total directional connectedness (from);
i.e., row sums (from all others to i). The bottom (To others) row gives total directional connectedness (to); i.e., column sums (to
all others from j). Next (Net) row gives the difference in total directional connectedness (to-from). The bottom-right numbers
are total connectedness (mean ’from’ connectedness, or equivalently, mean ’to’ connectedness). The bottommost row also gives
bi-variate spillovers.
41
0
5
10
0.
51
1.
52
2.
5
18
23
-
18
50
Growth
0
5
10
0.
51
1.
52
2.
5
18
51
-
18
69
0
5
10
0.
51
1.
52
2.
5
18
70
-
19
14
0
5
10
0.
51
1.
52
2.
5
19
15
-
19
16
0
5
10
0.
51
1.
52
2.
5
19
17
-
19
51
0
5
10
0.
51
1.
52
2.
5
19
52
-
19
75
0
5
10
0.
51
1.
52
2.
5
19
76
-
19
89
0
5
10
0.
51
1.
52
2.
5
19
90
-
20
14
0
5
10
0246
Inflation
0
5
10
0246
0
5
10
0246
0
5
10
0246
0
5
10
0246
0
5
10
0246
0
5
10
0246
0
5
10
0246
0
5
10
0246810
Short rate
0
5
10
0246810
0
5
10
0246810
0
5
10
0246810
0
5
10
0246810
0
5
10
0246810
0
5
10
0246810
0
5
10
0246810
F
ig
u
re
1:
N
o
te
s:
G
en
er
a
li
ze
d
im
p
u
ls
e
re
sp
o
n
se
s
o
f
th
re
e
va
ri
a
b
le
s
ov
er
te
n
y
ea
rs
a
ft
er
o
n
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
p
o
in
t
g
ro
w
th
sh
o
ck
.
R
ow
s
in
d
ic
a
te
th
e
va
ri
a
b
le
s
th
a
t
re
sp
o
n
d
to
th
e
sh
o
ck
.
B
lu
e
d
o
tt
ed
a
n
d
d
a
sh
ed
li
n
es
w
it
h
sh
a
d
ed
co
n
fi
d
en
ce
in
te
rv
a
ls
a
ss
u
m
e
p
a
ra
m
et
er
co
n
st
a
n
cy
.
A
re
sp
o
n
se
in
so
li
d
re
d
li
n
e
w
it
h
d
o
tt
ed
co
n
fi
d
en
ce
in
te
rv
a
l
is
sp
ec
ifi
c
to
th
e
su
b
-r
eg
im
e
sp
ec
ifi
ed
o
n
th
e
to
p
.
F
o
r
ea
ch
p
lo
t
tw
o
-s
ta
n
d
a
rd
-d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
w
id
e
co
n
fi
d
en
ce
in
te
rv
a
l
is
o
b
ta
in
ed
u
si
n
g
a
b
o
o
ts
tr
a
p
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
ex
p
la
in
ed
in
th
e
te
x
t.
42
0
5
10
-
1
-
0.
50
0.
51
18
23
-
18
50
Growth
0
5
10
-
1
-
0.
50
0.
51
18
51
-
18
69
0
5
10
-
1
-
0.
50
0.
51
18
70
-
19
14
0
5
10
-
1
-
0.
50
0.
51
19
15
-
19
16
0
5
10
-
1
-
0.
50
0.
51
19
17
-
19
51
0
5
10
-
1
-
0.
50
0.
51
19
52
-
19
75
0
5
10
-
1
-
0.
50
0.
51
19
76
-
19
89
0
5
10
-
1
-
0.
50
0.
51
19
90
-
20
14
0
5
10
123456
Inflation
0
5
10
123456
0
5
10
123456
0
5
10
123456
0
5
10
123456
0
5
10
123456
0
5
10
123456
0
5
10
123456
0
5
10
02468
Short rate
0
5
10
02468
0
5
10
02468
0
5
10
02468
0
5
10
02468
0
5
10
02468
0
5
10
02468
0
5
10
02468
F
ig
u
re
2:
N
o
te
s:
G
en
er
a
li
ze
d
im
p
u
ls
e
re
sp
o
n
se
s
o
f
th
re
e
va
ri
a
b
le
s
ov
er
te
n
y
ea
rs
a
ft
er
o
n
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
p
o
in
t
in
fl
a
ti
o
n
sh
o
ck
.
S
ee
N
o
te
s
to
F
ig
u
re
1
.
43
0
5
10
-
4
-
202
18
23
-
18
50
Growth
0
5
10
-
4
-
202
18
51
-
18
69
0
5
10
-
4
-
202
18
70
-
19
14
0
5
10
-
4
-
202
19
15
-
19
16
0
5
10
-
4
-
202
19
17
-
19
51
0
5
10
-
4
-
202
19
52
-
19
75
0
5
10
-
4
-
202
19
76
-
19
89
0
5
10
-
4
-
202
19
90
-
20
14
0
5
10
051015
Inflation
0
5
10
051015
0
5
10
051015
0
5
10
051015
0
5
10
051015
0
5
10
051015
0
5
10
051015
0
5
10
051015
0
5
10
2468101214
Short rate
0
5
10
2468101214
0
5
10
2468101214
0
5
10
2468101214
0
5
10
2468101214
0
5
10
2468101214
0
5
10
2468101214
0
5
10
2468101214
F
ig
u
re
3:
N
o
te
s:
G
en
er
a
li
ze
d
im
p
u
ls
e
re
sp
o
n
se
s
o
f
th
re
e
va
ri
a
b
le
s
ov
er
te
n
y
ea
rs
a
ft
er
o
n
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
p
o
in
t
sh
o
rt
ra
te
sh
o
ck
.
S
ee
N
o
te
s
to
F
ig
u
re
1
.
7 References
Alogoskoufis G. S., and Smith, R. 1991. The Phillips curve, the persistence of inflation, and the Lucas critique:
evidence from exchange rate regimes. American Economic Review 81, 1254-1275.
Amir-Ahmadi, P., Matthes, C. and Wang, M. 2014. Drifts, volatilities and impulse responses over the last
century. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Paper Series 14/10.
Bai, J. and Perron, P. 1998. Estimating and testing linear models with multiple structural changes. Economet-
rica 66, 47-78.
Bai, J., Lumsdaine, R.,L. and Stock, J.H. 1998. Testing for and dating common breaks in multivariate time
series. Review of Economic Studies 65, 395-432.
Balke, N. S., and K. M. Emery. 1994, The Federal funds rate as an indicator of monetary policy: Evidence
from the 1980s, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review, First Quarter, 1-15.
Barro, R. J. 2013. Inflation and economic growth. Annals of Economics and Finance 14(1), 121-144.
Barth, M. J., and Ramey, V. A. 2001. The Cost channel of monetary transmission. NBER Macroeconomics
Annual 16, 199-256.
Bataa, E., Osborn, D.R., Sensier, M., and van Dijk, D. 2013. Structural breaks in the international dynamics
of inflation. Review of Economics and Statistics 95 (2): 646-659.
. 2014. Identifying changes in mean, seasonality, persistence
and volatility for G7 and Euro Area inflation. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 76(3), 360-388.
. 2015. Changes in International Growth Spillovers. mimeo.
National University of Mongolia.
Benati, L. 2004. Evolving post-World War II UK economic performance. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
36 (4): 691-717.
. 2008a. Investigating inflation persistence across monetary regimes, Quarterly Journal of Economics
123, 1105-1160.
. 2008b. The ’Great Moderation’ in the United Kingdom. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 40
(1): 121-147.
Benati, L., and P. Surico. 2009. VAR analysis and the Great Moderation. American Economic Review 99 (4),
1636-1652
Bernanke, B. S., and A. S. Blinder. 1992. The Federal funds rate and the channels of monetary transmission.
American Economic Review 82, 901-921.
Bernanke, B., Boivin, J., and Eliasz, P.S. 2005. Measuring the effects of monetary policy: A factor-augmented
vector autoregression (FAVAR) approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 387-422.
Bick, A. 2010. Threshold effects of inflation on economic growth in developing countries. Economics Letters
108, 126-129.
Blake, A.P. and Kapetanios, G. 2007. Testing for ARCH in the presence of nonlinearity of unknown form in
the conditional mean. Journal of Econometrics 137(2), 472-488
Blanchard, O. and Quah, D. 1989. The dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply. American Economic
Review 79, 655-673.
Burdekin, R.C.K. and Siklos, P.L. 1999. Exchange rate regimes and shifts in inflation persistence: Does nothing
44
else matter? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 31, 235-247.
Carrion-i-Silvestre, J.L., Kim, D., Perron, P., 2009. GLS-based unit root tests with multiple structural breaks
both under the null and the alternative hypotheses. Econometric Theory 25, 1754-1792.
Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M., Evans, C. L. 1994. The Effects of monetary policy shocks: Evidence from
the flow of funds. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper Series, no. 94 -2.
. 1999. Monetary policy shocks: What have we learned and to what end?,
in J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford, eds., Handbook of Macroeconomics Vol. 1, Elsevier, chapter 2, pp. 65-148.
. forthcoming. Identification and the effects of monetary policy shocks. in
M. Blejer, Z. Eckstein, Z. Hercowitz, & L. Leiderman, eds., Financial Factors in Economic Stabilization
and Growth. Cambridge University Press.
Cheung, Y.W. and Ng, L.K., 1996. A causality-in-variance test and its application to financial market prices.Journal
of Econometrics 72, 33-48
Crowder, W.J., & D.L. Hoffman. 1996. The long-run relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation:
the Fisher equation revisited. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 28 (1): 102-118.
Davidson R. & J.G. MacKinnon. 1993. Estimation and Inference in Econometrics. Oxford University Press.
New York.
Diebold, F.X. & Yilmaz, K. 2009. Measuring financial asset return and volatility spillovers, with application to
global equity markets. Economic Journal 119, 158-171.
. 2012. Better to give than to receive: predictive directional measurement of volatility
spillovers (with discussion). International Journal of Forecasting 28, 57-66.
. 2014. On the network topology of variance decompositions: Measuring the connectedness
of financial firms. Journal of Econometrics 182, 119-134
Testing for causality in variance in the presence of breaks
Evans, M., & K. Lewis. 1995. Do Expected Shifts in Inflation Affect Estimates of the Long-Run Fisher Relation?
Journal of Finance, 50 (March): 225-253.
Estrella, A., & Hardouvelis, G. A. 1991. The term structure as a predictor of real economic activity. Journal
of Finance 46(2), 555-576.
Fama, E.F. 1981. Stock returns, real activity, inflation, and money. The American Economic Review, 545-565.
Fuhrer, J.C., & Moore, G. R.1995. Monetary policy, trade-offs and the correlation between nominal rates and
real output. American Economic Review 85, 219-239.
De Gregorio, J. 1993. Inflation, taxation, and long-run growth. Journal of Monetary Economics 31, 171-198.
Gambe, E.N. and Joutz, F. 1993 .The dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply disturbances: Comment.
American Economic Review 83, 1387-1393.
Ghosh, A., & Phillips, S. 1998. Warning: inflation may be harmful to your growth. IMF Staff Papers 45,
672-710.
Gillman, M., Harris, M. N., & Matyas, L. 2004. Inflation and growth: Explaining a negative effect. Empirical
Economics 29, 149-167.
Giordani, P. 2004. An Alternative explanation of the price puzzle. Journal of Monetary Economics 51, 1271-96.
Guerrero, F. 2006. Does inflation cause poor long-term growth performance? Japan and the World Economy
45
18, 72-89.
Gylfason, T.,& Herbertsson, T.T. 2001. Does inflation matter for growth? Japan and the World Economy 13,
405-428.
Hall, A. and Sakkas, N. 2013. Approximate p-values of certain tests involving hypotheses about multiple breaks.
Journal of Econometric Methods 2(1), 53-67.
Hanson, M. S. 2004. The ”price puzzle” reconsidered. Journal of Monetary Economics 51(7),1385-1413.
Haug A.A. and W.G. Dewald. 2011. Money, Output, and Inflation in the Longer Term: Major Industrial
Countries, 1880-2001. Economic Inquiry 50 (3): 773-787.
Hong, Y. 2001. A test for volatility spillover with application to exchange rates. Journal of Econometrics 103,
183-224.
Irwin, D.A. 1988. Welfare effects of British free trade: debate and evidence from the 1840s. Journal of Political
Economy 96, 1142-1164.
Kejriwal, M. and Perron, P. 2010. A sequential procedure to determine the number of breaks in trend with an
integrated or stationary noise component. Journal of Time Series Analysis 31, 305-328.
Kejriwal, M. and Lopez, C. 2013. Unit roots, level shifts, and trend breaks in per capita output: A robust
evaluation. Econometric Reviews 32(8), 892-927.
Khan, M.S., & Senhadji, A.S. 2001. Threshold effects in the relationship between inflation and growth. IMF
Staff Papers 48, 1-21.
Kim, C-J. and C.R. Nelson. 1999. Has the US economy become more stable? A Bayesian approach based on a
Markov-switching model of the business cycle. Review of Economics and Statistics 81 (4): 608-616.
Koop, G., Pesaran, M. H. and Potter, S. M. 1996. Impulse response analysis in non-linear multivariate models.
Journal of Econometrics 74, 119-147.
Lee, B.S. 1992. Causal relations among stock returns, interest rates, real activity, and inflation. Journal of
Finance 47 (4): 1591-1603.
Lumsdaine, R.L. and Ng, S. 1999. Testing for ARCH in the presence of a possibly misspecified conditional
mean. Journal of Econometrics 93, 257279.
Lutkepohl, H. 1989. The stability assumption in tests of causality between money and income. In Econometrics
of Structural Change; Kramer, W., Ed.; Springer-Verlag: New York, 75-86.
., New Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis. Springer.
Lopez-Villavicencio, A., & Mignon, V. 2011. On the impact of inflation on output growth: Does the level of
inflation matter? Journal of Macroeconomics 33, 455-464.
Mikosch, T. and Starica, C. 2004. Non-stationarities in financial time series, the long range dependence and
the IGARCH effects. Review of Economics and Statistics 86, 378-390.
Mishkin, F.S. 1992. Is the Fisher effect for real?: A reexamination of the relationship between inflation and
interest rates. Journal of Monetary Economics 30 (2): 195-215.
Ng, S. and Perron, P. 2001. Lag length selection and the construction of unit root tests with good size and
power. Econometrica 69, 1519-1554,
Officer, L.H. 2015. What were the UK earnings and prices then? MeasuringWorth,
http:www.measuringworth.com
46
Omay, T., & Kan, E. . 2010. Re-examining the threshold effects in the inflation-growth nexus with cross-
sectional dependent non-linear panel: Evidence from six industrialized economies. Economic Modelling
27, 996-1005.
Perron, P. 1989. The Great crash, the oil price shock and the unit root hypothesis. Econometrica 57, 1361-1401,
Perron, P. and Yabu, T. 2009. Testing for Shifts in Trend with an Integrated or Stationary Noise Component.
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 27(3), 369-396,
Pesaran, M. H. and Shin, Y. 1998. Generalized impulse response analysis in linear multivariate models. Eco-
nomics Letters 58, 17-29.
Plosser, C. I., & Rouwenhorst, K. G. 1994. International term structures and real economic growth. Journal of
Monetary Economics 33(1), 133-155.
Primiceri, G. E. 2005. Time varying structural vector autoregressions and monetary policy. Review of Economic
Studies 72(3), 821-852.
Qu, Z.J. and Perron, P. 2007. Estimating and testing structural changes in multivariate regressions. Economet-
rica 75, 459-502.
Rabanal, P. 2007. Does inflation increase after a monetary tightening? Answers based on an estimated DSGE
model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31, 906-937.
Rapach, D.E. 2003. International evidence on the long-run impact of inflation. Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking. 35 (1): 23-48.
Rapach, D.E. and M.E. Wohar 2005. Regime Changes in International Real Interest Rates: Are They a
Monetary Phenomeneon. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking. 37 (5): 887-906.
Rusnak, M., Havranek, T., & Horvath, R. 2013. How to solve the price puzzle? A Meta-analysis. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 45, 37-70.
Sarel, M. 1996. Nonlinear effects of inflation on growth. IMF Staff Papers 43, 199-215.
Shiller, R.J. and P. Perron. 1985. Testing the Random Walk Hypothesis: Power Versus Frequency of Observa-
tion. Economics Letters. 18. 381-86.
Sims, C.A. 1980. Macroeconomics and Reality. Econometrica. 48: 1-48.
. 1992. Interpreting the macroeconomic time series Ffcts: The Effects of monetary policy. European
Economic Review 36. 975-1000.
Stock, J.H. and M.W. Watson. 2002. Has the business cycle changed and why? In NBER Macroeconomics
Annual, 17: 159-230. MIT press.
. 2007. Why has US inflation become harder to forecast? Journal of Money, Credit
and banking, 39 (1): 3-33.
47
